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Abstract—Covert communication aims to shield the very ex-
istence of wireless transmissions in order to guarantee a strong
security in wireless networks. In this work, for the first time
we examine the possibility and achievable performance of covert
communication in one-way relay networks. Specifically, the relay
opportunistically transmits its own information to the destination
covertly on top of forwarding the source’s message, while the
source tries to detect this covert transmission to discover the
illegitimate usage of the recourse (e.g., power, spectrum) allocated
only for the purpose of forwarding source’s information. The
necessary condition that the relay can transmit covertly without
being detected is identified and the source’s detection limit is
derived in terms of the false alarm and miss detection rates.
Our analysis indicates that boosting the forwarding ability of
the relay (e.g., increasing its maximum transmit power) also
increases its capacity to perform the covert communication in
terms of achieving a higher effective covert rate subject to some
specific requirement on the source’s detection performance.
I. INTRODUCTION
Security and privacy are critical in existing and future
wireless networks since a large amount of confidential infor-
mation (e.g., location, credit card information, physiological
information for e-health) is transferred over the open wireless
medium [1]. Against this background, conventional cryptogra-
phy and information-theoretic secrecy technologies have been
developed to offer progressively higher levels of security by
protecting the content of the message against eavesdropping
[2]–[4]. However, these technologies cannot mitigate the threat
to a user’s security and privacy from discovering the presence
of the user or communication. Meanwhile, this strong security
(i.e., hiding the wireless transmission) is desired in many
application scenarios of wireless communications, such as
covert military operations and avoiding to be tracked in vehic-
ular ad hoc networks. As such, the hiding of communication
termed covert communication or low probability of detection
communication, which aims to shield the very existence of
wireless transmissions against a warden to achieve security,
has recently drawn significant research interests and is emerg-
ing as a cutting-edge technique in the context of wireless
communication security [5], [6].
The fundamental limit of covert communication has been
studied under various channel conditions, such as additive
white Gaussian noise (AWGN) channel [7], binary symmetric
channel [8], and discrete memoryless channel [9]. It is proved
that O(√n) bits of information can be transmitted to a
legitimate receiver reliably and covertly in n channel uses as
n→∞. This means that the associated covert rate is zero due
to limn→∞O(√n)/n→ 0. Following these pioneering works
on covert communication, a positive rate has been proved to
be achievable when the warden has uncertainty on his receiver
noise power [10], [11], the warden does not know when the
covert communication happens [12], or an uniformed jammer
comes in to help [13]. Most recently, [14] has examined
the impact of noise uncertainty on covert communication
by considering two practical uncertainty models in order to
debunk the myth of this impact. In addition, the effect of the
imperfect channel state information and finite blocklength (i.e.,
finite n) on covert communication has been investigated in [15]
and [16], respectively.
In this work, for the first time we consider covert com-
munication in the context of one-way relay networks. This
is motivated by the scenario where the relay (R) tries to
transmit its own information to the destination (D) on top of
forwarding the information from the source (S) to D, while S
forbids R’s transmission of its own message since the resource
(e.g., power, spectrum) allocated to R by S is dedicated to be
solely used on aiding the transmission from S to D. As such,
R’s transmission of its own message to D should be kept
covert from S, where S acts as the warden trying to detect
this covert communication. We first identify the necessary
condition that the covert transmission from R to D can possibly
occur without being detected by S and then derive the detection
limit at S in terms of the false alarm and miss detection rates
under this condition. In addition, we analyze the achievable
effective covert rate subject to a requirement on the detection
performance at S. Our examination demonstrates a tradeoff
between R’s ability to aid the transmission from S to D and
R’s capability to conduct the covert communication.
II. SYSTEM MODEL
A. Considered Scenario and Adopted Assumptions
As shown in Fig. 1, in this work we consider a one-way
relay network, in which S transmits information to D with
the aid of R, since a direct link from S to D is not available.
As mentioned in the introduction, S allocates some resource
to R in order to seek its help to relay the message to D.
However, in some scenarios R may intend to use this resource
to transmit its own message to D as well, which is forbidden
by S and thus should be kept covert from S. As such, in
the considered system model S is also the warden to detect
whether R transmits its own information to D when it is aiding
the transmission from S to D.
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Fig. 1. Covert communication in one-way relay networks.
We assume the wireless channels within our system model
are subject to independent quasi-static Rayleigh fading with
equal block length and the channel coefficients are indepen-
dent and identically distributed (i.i.d.) circularly symmetric
complex Gaussian random variables with zero-mean and unit-
variance. We also assume that each node is equipped with a
single antenna. The channel from S to R is denoted by hsr
and the channel from R to D is denoted by hrd. We assume
R knows both hsr and hrd perfectly, while S only knows hsr
and D only knows hrd. Considering channel reciprocity, we
assume the channel from R to S (denoted by hrs) is the same
as hsr and thus perfectly known by S. We further assume that
R operates in the half-duplex mode and thus the transmission
from S to D occurs in two phases: phase 1 (S transmits to R)
and phase 2 (R transmits to D).
B. Transmission from Source to Relay (Phase 1)
In phase 1, the received signal at R is given by
yr[i] =
√
Pshsrxb[i] + nr[i], (1)
where Ps is the transmit power of source, xb is the transmitted
signal by S satisfying E[xb[i]x
†
b[i]] = 1, i = 1, 2, . . . , n is the
index of each channel use (n is the total number of channel
uses in each phase), and nr[i] is the AWGN at relay with σ
2
r
as its variance, i.e., nr[i] ∼ CN (0, σ2r).
In this work, we consider that R operates in the amplify-
and-forward mode and thus R will forward a linearly amplified
version of the received signal to D in phase 2. As such, the
forwarded (transmitted) signal by R is given by
xr[i] = Gyr[i] = G(
√
Pshsrxb[i] + nr[i]), (2)
where the received signal is scaled by a scalar G. In order
to guarantee the power constraint at R, the value of G must
be chosen such that E[xr[i]x
†
r[i]] = 1, which leads to G =
1/
√
Ps|hsr|2 + σ2r .
In this work, we consider a fixed-rate transmission from S
to D, in which this rate is denoted by Rsd. We also consider
a maximum power constraint at R, i.e., Pr ≤ Pmaxr . As such,
although R knows both hsr and hrd perfectly, transmission
outage from S to D still incurs when C∗sd < Rsd, where
C∗sd is the channel capacity from S to D for Pr = P
max
r .
Then, the transmission outage probability is given by δ =
P [C∗sd < Rsd]. In practice, the pair of Rsd and δ determines
the specific aid (i.e., the value of Pmaxr ) required by S from
R, which relates to the amount of resource allocated to R by
S as a payback. In this work, we assume both Rsd and δ are
predetermined, which leads to a predetermined Pmaxr .
III. TRANSMISSION STRATEGIES AT RELAY
In this section, we detail the transmission strategies of R
when it does and does not transmit its own information to D.
We also determine the condition that R can transmit its own
message to D without being detected by S with probability
one, in which the probability to guarantee this condition is
also derived.
A. Relay’s Transmission without Covert Message
In the case when relay does not transmit its own message
(i.e., covert message) to Bob, it only transmit xr to D.
Accordingly, the received signal at D is given by
yd[i] =
√
P 0r hrdxr[i] + nd[i] (3)
=
√
P 0rGhrd
√
Pshsrxb[i] +
√
P 0rGhrdnr[i] + nd[i],
where P 0r is the transmit power of xr at R in this case and
nd[i] is the AWGN at D with σ
2
d as the variance, i.e., nd[i] ∼
CN (0, σ2d). Accordingly, the signal-to-noise ratio (SNR) at the
destination for xb is given by
γd =
Ps|hsr|2P 0r |hrd|2G2
P 0r |hrd|2G2σ2r + σ2d
=
γ1γ2
γ1 + γ2 + 1
, (4)
where γ1 , (Ps|hsr|2)/σ2r and γ2 , (P 0r |hrd|2)/σ2d .
For the fixed-rate transmission, R does not have to adopt the
maximum transmit power for each channel realization in order
to guarantee a specific transmission outage probability. When
the transmission outage occurs (i.e., C∗sd < Rsd occurs), R
will not transmit (i.e., P 0r = 0). When C
∗
sd ≥ Rsd, R only has
to ensure Csd = Rsd, where Csd = 1/2 log2(1 + γd). Then,
following (4) the transmit power of R when C∗sd ≥ Rsd is
given by P 0r = µσ
2
d/|hrd|2, where
µ ,
(Ps|hsr|2 + σ2r )(22Rsd − 1)
[Ps|hsr|2 − σ2r (22Rsd − 1)]
. (5)
Noting γd < γ1, we have 1/2 log2(1+γ1) > Rsd when Csd =
Rsd. As such, µ given in (5) is nonnegative. Following (4), we
note that C∗sd ≥ Rsd requires |hrd|2 ≥ µσ2d/Pmaxr . As such,
the transmit power of R without covert message is given by
P 0r =


µσ2d
|hrd|2
, |hrd|2 ≥ µσ
2
d
Pmaxr
,
0, |hrd|2 < µσ
2
d
Pmaxr
.
(6)
B. Relay’s Transmission with Covert Message
In the case when R transmits the covert message to D on
top of forwarding xb, the received signal at D is given by
yd[i] =
√
P 1rGhrd
√
Pshsrxb[i] +
√
P∆hrdxc[i]
+
√
P 1rGhrdnr[i] + nd[i]. (7)
where P 1r is the transmit power of R to forward xb under
this case and P∆ is the power of R used to transmit the
covert message xc satisfying E[xc[i]x
†
c[i]] = 1. In this work,
we assume that P∆ is fixed for all channel realizations. In
general, the transmit power of a covert message is significantly
less than that of the forwarded message, i.e., P∆ << P
1
r .
As such, here we assume D always first decodes xb with xc
as interference. Following (7), the signal-to-interference-plus-
noise ratio (SINR) for xb is given by
γd =
Ps|hsr|2P 1r |hrd|2G2
P 1r |hrd|2G2σ2r + P∆|hrd|2 + σ2d
=
γ1γ3
γ3 + (γ1 + 1) (γ3P∆/P 1r + 1)
, (8)
where γ3 , (P 1r |hrd|2)/σ2d. Then, when Csd = Rsd we have
P 1r = µP∆ +
µσ2d
|hrd|2 , (9)
which requires C∗sd ≥ Rsd that leads to |hrd|2 ≥
µσ2d/[P
max
r − (µ+ 1)P∆]. Considering the maximum power
constraint at R (i.e., P 1r + P∆ ≤ Pmaxr under this case), R
has to give up the transmission of the covert message (i.e.,
P∆ = 0) when P
1
r > P
max
r −P∆ and sets P 1r the same as P 0r
given in (6). This is due to the fact that S knows hrs and it
can detect with probability one when the total transmit power
of R is greater than Pmaxr . Then, the transmit power of xr
under this case is given by
P 1r = (10)

µP∆ +
µσ2d
|hrd|2
, |hrd|2 ≥ µσ
2
d
Pmaxr −(µ+1)P∆
,
µσ2d
|hrd|2
,
µσ2d
Pmaxr
≤ |hrd|2 < µσ
2
d
Pmaxr −(µ+1)P∆
,
0, |hrd|2 < µσ
2
d
Pmaxr
.
As per (10), we note that R also does not transmit covert
message when it cannot support the transmission from S to
D (i.e., when |hrd|2 < µσ2d/Pmaxr ). This is due to the fact
that a transmission outage occurs when |hrd|2 < µσ2d/Pmaxr
and D will request a retransmission from S, which enables S
to detect R’s covert transmission with probability one if this
happens. In summary, S cannot detect R’s covert transmis-
sion with probability one (R could possibly transmit covert
message without being detected) only when the condition
|hrd|2 ≥ µσ2d/[Pmaxr − (µ+ 1)P∆] is guaranteed. We denote
this necessary condition for covert communication as C. Con-
sidering Rayleigh fading, the cumulative distribution function
(cdf) of |hrd|2 is given by F|hrd|2(x) = 1− e−x and thus the
probability that C is guaranteed is given by
Pc = exp
{
− µσ
2
d
Pmaxr − (µ+ 1)P∆
}
. (11)
We note that Pc is a monotonic decreasing function of
P∆, which indicates that the probability that R can trans-
mit covert message (without being detected with probability
one) decreases as P∆ increases. Following (9) and noting
P 1r + P∆ ≤ Pmaxr , we have Pmaxr > (µ + 1)P∆ and thus
0 ≤ Pc ≤ 1.
IV. BINARY DETECTION AT SOURCE
In this section, we first present the detection strategy
adopted by S (i.e., Source) and then analyze the associated
detection performance in terms of the false alarm and miss
detection rates. Finally, the optimal detection threshold at S
that minimizes the total error rate is examined.
A. Binary Hypothesis Test
In phase 2 when R transmits to D, S is to detect whether
R transmits the covert message xc on top of forwarding S’s
message xb to D. In this section, we only focus on the case
when C is guaranteed since R never transmits covert message
when C is not met, as discussed in Section III-B. R does not
transmit xc in the null hypothesis H0 while it does in the
alternative hypothesis H1. Then, the received signal at S in
phase 2 is given by
ys[i]=
{ √
P 0r hrsxr[i] + ns[i], H0,√
P 1r hrsxr[i] +
√
P∆hrsxc[i]+ns[i], H1,
(12)
where ns[i] is the AWGN at S with σ
2
s as its variance. We
note that neither P 0r nor P
1
r is known at S since it does not
know hrd, while the statistics of P
0
r and P
1
r are known since
the distribution of hrd is publicly known. The ultimate goal
of S is to detect whether ys comes from H0 or H1 in one
fading block. As proved in [15], the optimal decision rule that
minimizes the total error rate at S is given by
T
D1
≷
D0
τ, (13)
where T = 1/n
∑n
i=1 |ys[i]|2, τ is a predetermined threshold,
D1 and D0 are the binary decisions that infer whether R
transmits covert message or not, respectively. In this work,
we consider infinite blocklength, i.e., n → ∞. As such, we
have
T =
{
P 0r |hrs|2 + σ2s , H0,
P 1r |hrs|2 + P∆|hrs|2+σ2s , H1.
(14)
B. False Alarm and Miss Detection Rates
In this subsection, we derive S’s false alarm rate, i.e.,
P(D1|H0), and miss detection rate, i.e., P(D0|H1).
Theorem 1: When the condition C is guaranteed, the false
alarm and miss detection rates at S are derived as
PFA =


1, τ < σ2s ,
1− κ1, σ2s ≤ τ ≤ ρ1,
0, τ > ρ1,
(15)
PMD =


0, τ < ρ2,
κ2, ρ2 ≤ τ ≤ ρ3,
1, τ > ρ3,
(16)
where
ρ1 , [Pmaxr − (µ+ 1)P∆]|hrs|2 + σ2s ,
ρ2 , (µ+ 1)P∆|hrs|2 + σ2s ,
ρ3 , Pmaxr |hrs|2 + σ2s ,
κ1(τ) , exp
{
µσ2d
[
1
Pmaxr − (µ+ 1)P∆
− |hrs|
2
τ − σ2s
]}
,
κ2(τ) , exp
{
µσ2d
[
1
Pmaxr − (µ+ 1)P∆
− |hrs|
2
τ − ρ2
]}
.
Proof: Considering the maximum power constraint at R
under H0 (i.e., P 0r ≤ Pmaxr ) and following (6), (13), and (14),
the false alarm rate under the condition C is given by
PFA = P
[
µσ2d
|hrd|2 |hrs|
2 + σ2s ≥ τ
∣∣C] (17)
=


1, τ < σ2s ,
P
[
µσ2
d
Pmaxr −(µ+1)P∆
≤|hrd|
2≤
µσ2
d
|hrs|
2
τ−σ2s
]
Pc
, σ2s ≤ τ ≤ ρ1,
0, τ > ρ1.
Then, substituting F|hrd|2(x) = 1 − e−x into the above
equation (hrs is perfectly known by S and thus it is not a
random variable here) we achieve the desired result in (15).
We first clarify that we have ρ2 < ρ3 due to P
max
r > (µ+
1)P∆ as discussed after (11). Then, considering the maximum
power constraint at R under H1 (i.e., P 1r + P∆ ≤ Pmaxr ) and
following (10), (13), and (14), the miss detection rate under
the condition C is given by
PMD = P
[(
µσ2d
|hrd|2 + (1 + µ)P∆
)
|hrs|2 + σ2s < τ
∣∣C]
=


0, τ < ρ2,
P
[
|hrd|
2≥
µσ2
d
|hrs|
2
τ−(µ+1)P∆ |hrs|
2−σ2s
]
Pc
, ρ2 ≤ τ ≤ ρ3,
1, τ > ρ3.
(18)
Then, substituting F|hrd|2(x) = 1 − e−x into the above
equation we achieve the desired result in (16).
We note that the false alarm and miss detection rates given
in Theorem 1 are functions of the threshold τ and we examine
how S sets the value of it in order to minimize its total error
rate. Specifically, the total error rate of the detection at S is
defined as
ξ , PFA + PMD, (19)
which is used to measure the detection performance at S.
C. Optimization of the Detection Threshold at Source
In this subsection, we examine how S optimally sets the
value of τ aiming to minimize ξ. To this end, we first
determine a preliminary constraint on P∆ and the bounds on
the optimal τ in the following theorem.
Theorem 2: R’s transmit power of the covert message P∆
should satisfy
P∆ ≤ Pu∆ , Pmaxr /[2(µ+ 1)] (20)
in order to guarantee ξ > 0 and when (20) is guaranteed the
optimal τ (τ∗) at S that minimizes ξ should satisfy ρ2 ≤ τ∗ ≤
ρ1.
Proof: When ρ1 < ρ2 that requires P∆ > P
max
r /[2(µ+
1)] as per Theorem 1, following (15) and (16), we have
ξ =


1, τ ≤ σ2s ,
1− κ1(τ), σ2s < τ < ρ1,
0, ρ1 ≤ τ ≤ ρ2,
κ2(τ), ρ2 < τ < ρ3,
1, τ ≥ ρ3.
(21)
This indicates that S can simply set τ ∈ [ρ1, ρ2] to ensure
ξ = 0 when P∆ > P
max
r /[2(µ + 1)], i.e., S can detect the
covert transmission with probability one. As such, P∆ should
satisfy (20) in order to guarantee ξ > 0.
When P∆ ≤ Pmaxr /[2(µ+1)], i.e., ρ2 < ρ1, following (15)
and (16), we have
ξ =


1, τ ≤ σ2s ,
1− κ1(τ), σ2s < τ ≤ ρ2,
1− κ1(τ) + κ2(τ), ρ2 < τ < ρ1,
κ2(τ), ρ1 ≤ τ < ρ3,
1, τ ≥ ρ3,
(22)
due to ρ3 > ρ1. Obviously, the optimal value of τ cannot
satisfy τ ≤ σ2s or τ ≥ ρ3.
For σ2s < τ ≤ ρ2, we derive the first derivative of ξ with
respect to τ as
∂(ξ)
∂τ
= −µσ
2
d|hrs|2
(τ − σ2s )2
κ1 < 0. (23)
This demonstrates that ξ is a decreasing function of τ and thus
we would have τ∗ = ρ2 when σ
2
s < τ ≤ ρ2.
For ρ1 ≤ τ < ρ3, we derive the first derivative of ξ with
respect to τ as
∂(ξ)
∂τ
=
µσ2d|hrs|2
[τ − (µ+ 1)P∆|hrs|2 − σ2s ]2
κ2 > 0. (24)
This proves that ξ is an increasing function of τ and we would
have τ∗ = ρ1 when ρ1 ≤ τ < ρ3.
Noting that ξ is a continuous function of τ , we can conclude
that τ∗ should satisfy ρ2 ≤ τ∗ ≤ ρ1, no mater what is the
value of ξ for ρ2 < τ < ρ1.
The lower and upper bounds on τ∗ given in Theorem 2
significantly facilitate the numerical search for τ∗ at S. Then,
following Theorem 2 and (22), τ∗ can be obtained through
τ∗ = argmin
ρ2≤τ≤ρ1
[1− κ1(τ) + κ2(τ)]. (25)
Substituting τ∗ into (22), we obtain the minimum value of ξ
as ξ∗ = 1− κ1(τ∗) + κ2(τ∗).
V. OPTIMIZATION OF EFFECTIVE COVERT RATE
In this section, we examine the effective covert rate achieved
in the considered system subject to a covert requirement.
A. Effective Covert Rate
As discussed in Section III-B, R can only transmit the
covert message without being detected by S with probability
one under the condition C. As such, a positive covert rate is
only achievable under this condition. When the covert message
is transmitted by R, D first decodes xb and subtracts the
corresponding component from its received signal yd given
in (7). Then, the effective received signal used to decode the
covert message xc is given by
y˜d[i] =
√
P∆hrdxc[i] +
√
P 1r hrdGnr[i] + nd[i]. (26)
As such, following (10) the SINR for xc is
γc =
P∆(η|hsr|2 + 1)|hrd|2
µP∆|hrd|2 + (η|hsr |2 + µ+ 1)σ2d
, (27)
where η , Ps/σ2r . Then, the covert rate achieved by R is
Rc = log2(1+γc). We next derive the effective covert rate, i.e.,
averaged Rc over all realizations of |hrd|2, in the following
theorem.
Theorem 3: The achievable effective covert rate Rc by R
is derived as a function of P∆ given by
Rc =
1
ln 2
exp
{
− µσ
2
d
Pmaxr − (µ+ 1)P∆
}
×[
ln
(
β1
β2
)
+ e
β2
α2Ei
(
−β2
α2
)
− e β1α1Ei
(
−β1
α1
)]
, (28)
where
β1 , [η|hsr |2 + (µ+ 1)](Pmaxr − P∆)σ2d,
β2 ,
{
η|hsr|2 + (µ+ 1)
[Pmaxr − (µ+ 1)P∆]−1
+ µ2P∆
}
σ2d,
α1 , P∆[η|hsr |2 + (µ+ 1)][Pmaxr − (µ+ 1)P∆],
α2 , µP∆[Pmaxr − (µ+ 1)P∆],
and the exponential integral function Ei(·) is given by
Ei(x) = −
∫ ∞
−x
e−t
t
dt, [x < 0]. (29)
Proof: A positive covert rate is only achievable under the
condition C and thus Rc is given by
Rc =
∫ ∞
µσ2
d
Pmaxr −(µ+1)P∆
Rcf(|hrd|2)d|hrd|2
a
=
1
ln 2
exp
{
− µσ
2
d
Pmaxr − (µ+ 1)P∆
}
×∫ ∞
0
ln
(
β1 + α1x
β2 + α2x
)
e−xdx, (30)
where
a
= is achieved by exchanging variables (i.e., setting x =
|hrd|2−µσ2d/[Pmaxr − (µ+ 1)P∆]). We then solve the integral
in (30) with the aid of [17, Eq. (4.337.1)] and achieve the result
given in (28).
Based on Theorem 3, we note that Rc is not an increasing
function of P∆, since as P∆ increasesRc increases but Pc (i.e.,
the probability that the condition C is guaranteed) decreases.
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Fig. 2. PFA, PMD , and ξ versus different values of the threshold τ , where
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r = 10 dB, σ
2
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2
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2
d
= 0 dB, P∆ = 0.5, Rsd = 1, and
|hsr|2 = |hrs|2 = 1.
B. Maximization of Rc with the Covert Constraint
A covert transmission normally requires ξ ≥ 1 − ǫ, where
ǫ ∈ [0, 1] is predetermined to specify the covert constraint. In
practice, it is impossible to know ξ at R since the threshold τ
adopted by S is unknown. In this work, we consider the worst-
case scenario where τ is optimized at S to minimize ξ. As
such, the covert constraint can be rewritten as ξ∗ ≥ 1−ǫ. Then,
following Theorem 2 the optimal value of P∆ that maximizes
Rc subject to this constraint can be obtained through
P ∗∆ = argmax
0≤P∆≤Pu∆
Rc (31)
s.t. ξ∗ ≥ 1− ǫ.
We note that this is a two-dimensional optimization problem
that can be solved by efficient numerical searches. Specifically,
for each given P∆, ξ
∗ should be obtained based on (25) where
τ∗ is also numerically searched. We note that the numerical
search of P ∗∆ and τ
∗ is efficient since their lower and upper
bounds are explicitly given.
VI. NUMERICAL RESULTS
In this section, we first examine the detection performance
at S (i.e., Source) under the condition C. Then, the impact
of some system parameters on the achievable effective covert
rate subject to a specific covert constraint is investigated.
In Fig. 2, we plot the false alarm rate PFA, miss detection
rate PMD, and total error rate ξ versus the threshold τ , in
which the adopted system parameters guarantee condition C
and P∆ ≤ Pu∆. As expected, we observe that ξ > 0 due
to the guaranteed condition C and P∆ ≤ Pu∆, which means
that covert transmission is possible (not being detected with
probability one) under this condition. We observe that the
minimum value of ξ is achieved when ρ2 ≤ τ ≤ ρ1, which
verifies the correctness of our Theorem 2.
In Fig. 3, we plot the minimum total error rate ξ∗ versus
the covert transmit power P∆, which is achieved through
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Fig. 3. ξ∗ versus P∆ with different value of Rsd, where Ps = 10 dB,
σ2r = σ
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2
= |hrs|2 = 1.
searching the optimal threshold τ∗ as per (25). In this fig-
ure, we first observe that ξ∗ monotonically decreases as P∆
increases, which demonstrates that the covert transmission
becomes easier to be detected when more power is used. As
such, the covert constraint ξ∗ ≥ 1− ǫ determines a maximum
possible value of P∆, which is significantly less than P
u
∆ since
we have ξ = 0 when P∆ = P
u
∆ but we normally require
ξ > 0.5 in practice [16]. This can facilitate the search of the
optimal value of P∆ as per (31) by significantly reducing the
feasible region of P∆. We also observe that ξ
∗ increases as
Pmaxr increases. This shows that covert transmission becomes
easier (i.e., the detection probability of covert transmission
at S 1 − ξ∗ decreases) as the desired performance of the
normal transmission increases (i.e., the transmission outage
probability decreases as Pmaxr increases for a fixed Rsd).
In Fig. 4, we plot the effective covert rate Rc versus P∆,
in which we also show the maximum possible value of P∆
determined by the covert constraint ξ∗ ≥ 1 − ǫ (denoted by
P ǫ∆ and marked by red circle in this figure). We first observe
that Rc may not be a monotonically increasing function of
P∆ without the constraint ξ
∗ ≥ 1− ǫ. This is due to the fact
that as P∆ increases the probability to guarantee the condition
C (i.e., Pc) decreases while the covert rate Rc increases. In
addition, we observe that Rc without ξ
∗ ≥ 1 − ǫ increases
as |hsr|2 increases. This is due to the fact that as |hsr|2
increases µ as given in (5) decreases, which leads to that
Pc increases, i.e., the probability that R can conduct covert
transmission increases (although the covert rate Rc does not
change). Finally, we observe that P ǫ∆ increases as well when
|hsr|2 increases. As such, following the last two observations
we can conclude that the achievable effective covert rate
with the constraint ξ∗ ≥ 1 − ǫ increases as |hsr|2 increases.
Intuitively, this is due to that as |hsr|2 increases R has a
higher chance to support the transmission of xb and perform
covert transmission, resulting in that from S’s point of view
the possible transmit power range of R used to transmit xb
increases (i.e., transmit power uncertainty increases).
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Fig. 4. Rc versus P∆ with different value of |hsr|
2, where Ps = P
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2
d
= 0 dB, and ǫ = 0.1 (ǫ is only for the red circles).
VII. CONCLUSION
This work examined covert communication in one-way
relay networks over Rayleigh fading channels. Specifically, we
analyzed S’s detection limit of the covert transmission from R
to D in terms of the total error rate. We also determined the
maximum achievable effective covert rate subject to ξ∗ ≥ 1−ǫ.
Our examination shows that covert communication in the
considered relay networks is feasible and a tradeoff between
the achievable effective covert rate and R’s performance of
aiding the transmission from S to D exists.
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